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Beyond Wickedness: Managing 
Complex Systems and Climate Change 
Jonathan M. Gilligan* 
Michael P. Vandenbergh** 
This Article examines the argument that climate change is a “super 
wicked” problem. It concludes that the wicked problem concept is best viewed 
as a rhetorical device that served a valuable function in arguing against 
technocratic hubris in the early 1970s but is unhelpful and possibly 
counterproductive as a tool for modern climate policy analysis. Richard 
Lazarus improved on this analysis by emphasizing the urgency of a climate 
response in his characterization of the climate problem as “super wicked.” We 
suggest another approach based on Charles Lindblom’s “science of muddling 
through.” The muddling through approach supports the rhetorical points for 
which the original wicked problem concept was introduced and provides greater 
practical guidance for developing new laws and policies to address climate 
change and other complex and messy environmental problems. 
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INTRODUCTION 
[E]verything that is, is wicked. . . 
—Giacomo Leopardi1 
[Y]ou must go on. I can’t go on. I’ll go on. 
—Samuel Beckett2 
 
The literature on policymaking for technically complex problems 
is rife with jargon for describing two fundamental challenges: first, 
natural science and engineering can very accurately describe the 
behavior of physical systems under controlled conditions but cannot 
answer normative and political questions regarding what goals a policy 
ought to aim for; and second, while science can describe the behavior of 
a system, if the system is complex, it may not be feasible to predict its 
future behavior. Widely used terminology for such policymaking 
conundrums includes “trans-science,”3 “wicked problems,”4 “post-
 
 1. Adam Kirsch, Under the Volcano, NEW YORKER (Oct. 25, 2010), https://www.new 
yorker.com/magazine/2010/10/25/under-the-volcano-adam-kirsch [https://perma.cc/8Y7Z-T8KB] 
(quoting GIACOMO LEOPARDI, ZIBALDONE (Michael Caesar & Franco D’Intino eds., Kathleen 
Baldwin et al. trans., Farrar, Straus & Giroux rev. ed. 2015) (1898)). 
 2. SAMUEL BECKETT, THE UNNAMABLE (1958), reprinted in THREE NOVELS BY SAMUEL 
BECKETT: MOLLOY, MALONE DIES, AND THE UNNAMABLE 399, 577 (Samuel Beckett trans., Grove 
Press 1st ed. 1959). 
 3. See Alvin M. Weinberg, Science and Trans-Science, 10 MINERVA 209, 209 (1972): 
Many of the issues which arise in the course of the interaction between science or 
technology and society—e.g., the deleterious side effects of technology, or the attempts 
to deal with social problems through the procedures of science—hang on the answers to 
questions which can be asked of science and yet which cannot be answered by science. I 
propose the term trans-scientific for these questions since, though they are, 
epistemologically speaking, questions of fact and can be stated in the language of 
science, they are unanswerable by science; they transcend science. 
 4. See Horst W.J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, 4 
POL’Y SCIS. 155, 155 (1973) (“The search for scientific bases for confronting problems of social policy 
is bound to fail, because of the nature of these problems. They are ‘wicked’ problems, whereas 
science has developed to deal with ‘tame’ problems.”); see also C. West Churchman, Guest Editorial: 
Wicked Problems, 14 MGMT. SCI. B-141, B-141 (1967) (describing “wicked problems” as “that class 
of social system problems which are ill-formulated, where the information is confusing, where 
there are many clients and decision makers with conflicting values, and where the ramifications 
in the whole system are thoroughly confusing”). 
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normal science,”5 “regulatory science,”6 “boundary work,” 7 “scientizing” 
policy debates,8 and “stealth issue advocacy.”9 Of these terms and 
concepts, “wicked problems” has been widely adopted, perhaps because 
of the frisson of the word “wicked.”  
Despite its wide use for over half a century, both the definition 
of “wicked problem” and its lessons for planning remain disputed and 
unclear. Some analysts have embraced the notion of “wickedness” and 
even extended it to characterize “super wicked” problems, such as 
climate change, which they see as even more intractable than merely 
wicked ones.10 Others criticize the conceptual coherence of wickedness, 
 
 5. See Silvio O. Funtowicz & Jerome R. Ravetz, Science for the Post-Normal Age, 25 FUTURES 
739, 744 (1993): 
To characterize an issue involving risk and the environment, in what we call ‘post-
normal science’, we can think of it as one where facts are uncertain, values in dispute, 
stakes high and decisions urgent. In such a case, the term ‘problem’, with its 
connotations of an exercise where a defined methodology is likely to lead to a clear 
solution, is less appropriate. 
 6. See Alvin M. Weinberg, Science and Its Limits: The Regulator’s Dilemma, 2 ISSUES SCI. 
& TECH. 59, 68 (1985): 
One way to deal with these assaults on scientists and scientific truth would be to define 
a new branch of science, called regulatory science, in which the norms of scientific proof 
are less demanding than are the norms in ordinary science. I should think that a far 
more honest and straightforward way of dealing with the intrinsic inability of science 
to predict the occurrence of rare events is to concede this limitation and not to ask of 
science or scientists more than they are capable of providing. Instead of asking science 
for answers to unanswerable questions, regulators should be content with less far-
reaching answers. 
 7. See SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS  
14 (1990): 
[S]cientists use a variety of boundary-defining strategies to establish who is in and who 
is out of relevant peer groups and networks of prestige or authority. The most 
consequential—and exclusionary—of all possible boundaries is that between “science” 
and other systems of cognitive authority, such as religion or law. 
 8. See Daniel Sarewitz, How Science Makes Environmental Controversies Worse, 7 ENV’T 
SCI. & POL’Y 385, 386 (2004): 
The argument, in brief, is this: nature itself—the reality out there—is sufficiently rich 
and complex to support a science enterprise of enormous methodological, disciplinary, 
and institutional diversity. I will argue that science, in doing its job well, presents this 
richness, through a proliferation of facts assembled via a variety of disciplinary lenses, 
in ways that can legitimately support, and are causally indistinguishable from, a range 
of competing, value-based political positions. I then show that, from this perspective, 
scientific uncertainty, which so often occupies a central place in environmental 
controversies, can be understood not as a lack of scientific understanding but as the 
lack of coherence among competing scientific understandings. 
 9. See ROGER A. PIELKE, JR., THE HONEST BROKER: MAKING SENSE OF SCIENCE IN POLICY 
AND POLITICS 94 (2007) (“Stealth issue advocacy refers to situations in which one claims to be 
serving as a Pure Scientist or Science Arbiter, but instead is focused on reducing the scope of choice 
available to decision-makers, which is the defining characteristic of an Issue Advocate.”). 
 10. See Kelly Levin, Benjamin Cashore, Steven Bernstein & Graeme Auld, Overcoming the 
Tragedy of Super Wicked Problems: Constraining Our Future Selves to Ameliorate Global Climate 
Change, 45 POL’Y SCIS. 123, 124 (2012) [hereinafter Levin et al., Overcoming the Tragedy] (“Super 
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arguing that it rests on a confused notion of the relationships between 
natural and social sciences and between systems analysis and policy 
practice.11 Others see that lack of coherence and clear definition as a 
deliberate response to overly formal methods of policy analysis.12  
Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber introduced the term “wicked 
problem” in 1973, posing a stark distinction between “tame” and 
“wicked” problems in policy and planning—a dichotomy that has not 
held up well.13 Some critics suggest that the original definition, which 
characterized tame problems as those that could be solved by purely 
scientific or technical procedures and wicked problems as those that 
contained an irreducibly normative or political component, in essence 
defined all nontrivial policy problems as wicked.14 Other critics argue 
that Rittel and Webber’s ten criteria of wickedness are too restrictive, 
so almost no problems satisfy the definition.15 Still others take a middle 
 
wicked problems comprise four key features: time is running out; those who cause the problem 
also seek to provide a solution; the central authority needed to address them is weak or non-
existent; and irrational discounting occurs that pushes responses into the future.”); see also 
Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to 
Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1157 (2008) (asserting that “[c]limate change 
legislation is peculiarly vulnerable to being unraveled over time for a variety of reasons, but 
especially because of the extent to which it imposes costs on the short term for the realization of 
benefits many decades and sometimes centuries later”); K. Levin, B. Cashore, Steven Bernstein & 
G. Auld, Playing It Forward: Path Dependency, Progressive Incrementalism, and the “Super 
Wicked” Problem of Global Climate Change, 6 IOP CONF. SERIES: EARTH & ENV’T SCI. 502002, 
502002 (2009) [hereinafter Levin et al., Playing It Forward] (explaining that solving super wicked 
problems may require significant interventions long before the negative consequences  
manifest themselves). 
 11. See Nick Turnbull & Robert Hoppe, Problematizing ‘Wickedness’: A Critique of the Wicked 
Problems Concept, from Philosophy to Practice, 38 POL’Y & SOC’Y 315, 316 (2019) (“Contrary to 
many ‘wicked problem’ scholars, we conclude that there is no special ontological class of ‘wicked’ 
problems, and therefore these require no special research program, nor special approaches to 
problem solving.”); see also Catrien J.A.M. Termeer, Art Dewulf & Robbert Biesbroek, A Critical 
Assessment of the Wicked Problem Concept: Relevance and Usefulness for Policy Science and 
Practice, 38 POL’Y & SOC’Y 167, 176 (2019) (explaining that, while furthering research in a number 
of fields, the notion of wicked problems has simultaneously created conceptual confusion). 
 12. See Mirko Noordegraaf, Scott Douglas, Karin Geuijen & Martijn Van Der Steen, 
Weaknesses of Wickedness: A Critical Perspective on Wickedness Theory, 38 POL’Y & SOC’Y 278,  
281 (2019): 
Wickedness was formulated on the 1960s campus of UC Berkeley as a playful and 
intentionally abstract answer to the attempt of the government in Washington to slice 
and dice, structure and rationalize world problems. The fundamental strength of 
wickedness theory is that it replaces this technocratic approach with a more holistic 
overview of the divisive mechanisms at play . . . . 
 13. Rittel & Webber, supra note 4, at 155. 
 14. See Turnbull & Hoppe, supra note 11, at 318 (“Wicked problems are not, in fact, limited 
to particular types of problems. It is societal problems in general that belong in the wicked category, 
in stark contrast to the solvable mathematical problems of engineers, e.g. ‘Planning problems are 
inherently wicked.’ ”). 
 15. See B. Guy Peters & Matthew Tarpey, Are Wicked Problems Really So Wicked? 
Perceptions of Policy Problems, 38 POL’Y & SOC’Y 218, 222–25 (2019) (“Having this extensive list of 
attributes means that relatively few problems actually will fit the full definition.”). 
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ground, seeing value in the conceptual perspective of wickedness but 
finding that it is too extreme in categorizing problems as either “tame” 
or “wicked” and arguing for a more “finely grained” approach with 
different degrees and qualities of wickedness.16 
The wicked problem concept emerged at a time of pessimism 
about progress. It was a time characterized by what Ulrich Beck and 
Anthony Giddens would later dub “reflexive modernization,” in which 
the Enlightenment’s project of rationality would turn its skeptical eye 
inward and critically analyze itself.17 In Beck’s analysis, the principal 
economic challenge had transformed from managing the distribution of 
scarce goods in early modernity to managing the distribution of 
abundant technological risks in late modernity.18 A few years earlier, 
the first Earth Day had mobilized an estimated twenty million 
Americans to demand action on pollution and environmental 
degradation.19 No wonder, then, Rittel and Webber presented pollution 
as a wicked problem.20 
More broadly, faith in rational management of societal problems 
had been badly eroded. A year before Rittel and Webber’s Wicked 
Problems paper, David Halberstam published The Best and the 
Brightest, in which he portrayed a group of accomplished technocratic 
leaders from industry and academia leading the United States into a 
tragic “quagmire” in the Vietnam War with “brilliant planning [that] 
defied common sense.”21 A year earlier, the Club of Rome had released 
its report, Limits to Growth, which turned rational mathematical 
systems analysis against itself, predicting that technological progress 
could very well lead not to prosperity and security but to scarcity and 
 
 16. See John Alford & Brian W. Head, Wicked and Less Wicked Problems: A Typology and a 
Contingency Framework, 36 POL’Y & SOC’Y 397, 398 (2017) (explaining that the term “wicked 
problem” is overused, and that a “more finely grained manner” must be employed to gain deeper 
insight into the nature of such problems); see also Peters & Tarpey, supra note 15, at 222–25 
(finding little unified consensus on what constitutes a wicked problem); Noordegraaf et al., supra 
note 12, at 281 (explaining that wicked problems were intentionally understood abstractly at  
their genesis). 
 17. See ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY 19–24 (Mark Ritter trans., 
Sage Publications 1992) (1986); ULRICH BECK, ANTHONY GIDDENS & SCOTT LASH, REFLEXIVE 
MODERNIZATION: POLITICS, TRADITION AND AESTHETICS IN THE MODERN SOCIAL ORDER 2–3 (1994). 
 18. BECK, supra note 17, at 19 (“In advanced modernity the social production of wealth is 
systematically accompanied by the social production of risks. Accordingly, the problems and 
conflicts relating to distribution in a society of scarcity overlap with the problems and conflicts 
that arise from the production, definition and distribution of techno-scientifically produced risks.”). 
 19. Jack Lewis, The Birth of EPA, 12 EPA J., Nov. 1985, at 6, 7. 
 20. See Rittel & Webber, supra note 4, at 168 (“Now, when it is recognized that raw materials 
that enter the economy end up as residuals polluting the air mantle and the rivers, many are 
becoming wary of rising manufacturing production.”). 
 21. DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST 578, 580 (1972). 
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collapse.22 And as the Wicked Problems paper went to press, Robert 
Caro was putting the finishing touches on his devastating biography of 
Robert Moses, The Power Broker, in which he described the hubris and 
fall from glory of the most prominent city planner of the twentieth 
century.23 Although they would not have read The Power Broker, as city 
planners, Rittel and Webber would surely have been intimately 
acquainted with the harsh turn of both public and expert opinion 
against Moses and his approach to planning. 
In this Article, we argue that the wicked problem is best viewed 
as a rhetorical device that served a valuable function in the early 1970s, 
arguing against technocratic hubris, but that it is unhelpful and indeed 
counterproductive as a tool for policy analysis. Climate change has often 
been treated as a paradigmatic wicked problem because both its causes 
and its consequences permeate deeply into many aspects of society and 
the economy and leave no clear boundary between the scientific and 
normative aspects. Characterizing climate change as wicked does little 
more than highlight the difficulty of the problem, however, and does not 
offer much practical guidance for managing it. In contrast, we find that 
Charles Lindblom’s “science of muddling through” both supports the 
same rhetorical points for which the original wicked problem concept 
was introduced and supports a pragmatic and useful approach to 
making policy for complex and messy environmental problems.24 
I. FROM WICKEDNESS TO PARALYSIS 
The historical moment when Rittel and Webber wrote Dilemmas 
in a General Theory of Planning25 was characterized by a growing 
skepticism toward technocratic optimism, a growing awareness of 
complexity in systems and its implications for the predictive power of 
quantitative mathematical analysis, and growing political demands 
from the public for accountability on the part of planners and 
 
 22. See DONELLA H. MEADOWS, DENNIS L. MEADOWS, JØRGEN RANDERS & WILLIAM W. 
BEHRENS III , THE LIMITS TO GROWTH 23 (1972): 
If the present growth trends in world population, industrialization, pollution, food 
production, and resource depletion continue unchanged, the limits to growth on this 
planet will be reached sometime within in the next one hundred years. The most 
probable result will be a rather sudden and uncontrollable decline in both population 
and industrial capacity.  
 23. See ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEW YORK 
18–21 (1974) (explaining how the idealism of Moses’ movement slowly devolved into a mere play 
for power). 
 24. See Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79, 
79–88 (1959) [hereinafter Lindblom, Muddling Through]; Charles E. Lindblom, Still Muddling, 
Not Yet Through, 39 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 517, 517–26 (1979) [hereinafter Lindblom, Still Muddling]. 
 25. Rittel & Webber, supra note 4, at 155. 
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policymakers.26 The paper does not merely describe a dilemma but 
represents a polemical attack on rational systems analysis as a method 
for planning.27 As such, the paper provides no positive guidance for the 
planner but presents an inescapable Slough of Despond in which 
planners are doomed to failure no matter what they do. 
Rittel and Webber’s ten criteria continue to be used widely to 
define wickedness: 
1. There is no definite formulation of the problem, so different 
stakeholders have different criteria for what the goals of a 
response should be. 
2. There is no stopping rule. 
3. Solutions are not true or false but better or worse. 
4. There is no immediate or long-term test for evaluating 
solutions. 
5. Any possible response to the problem is a “one-shot 
operation” that may fundamentally and irreversibly change 
the nature of the problem. 
6. There is not a manageable set of possible responses to 
compare and choose from; the domain of possible responses 
is large and possibly infinite. 
7. Every wicked problem is essentially unique, so there is no 
opportunity to learn from experience with other problems. 
8. Every wicked problem may be the symptom of another 
problem, so responses are doomed to managing symptoms 
rather than root causes. 
9. There are multiple competing explanations for what causes 
any wicked problem. 
10. The political context is sufficiently fraught such that the 
public will not tolerate mistakes or failures by the planner.28 
Three crucial properties stand out from this list and render 
wicked problems especially intractable: First, the seventh criterion, 
“[e]very wicked problem is essentially unique,” limits planners’ ability 
to use their experience with other problems to guide their response to a 
new problem.29  
 
 26. See Turnbull and Hoppe, supra note 11, at 326 (“Scientists carefully craft their ‘tame’ or 
‘well-structured’ problems in such a way that scientific methods are effective as justifications of 
their answers.”). 
 27. Noordegraaf et al., supra note 12, at 281 (“However, this abstract view also means 
wickedness can remain removed from daily practices, people, and places.”). 
 28. Peters & Tarpey, supra note 15, at 236 app. (summarizing the ten criteria in Rittel & 
Webber, supra note 4). 
 29.  Rittel & Webber, supra note 4, at 164. 
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Second, the third and fourth items in the list imply that “there 
is no opportunity to learn by trial-and-error.”30 We cannot know how 
well an action is doing at solving the problem, and even if we could, the 
irreversible effects of interventions make it impossible to back off from 
an action that is not working. This property is an extreme case of the 
more general principle of path dependence. As city planners 
themselves, Rittel and Webber illustrate the “one-shot” nature of 
interventions by observing that “[o]ne cannot build a freeway to see how 
it works and then easily correct it after unsatisfactory performance.”31 
It is tempting to imagine them thinking, as they wrote this, about 
Robert Moses’s Cross-Bronx Expressway, which was proposed and 
designed as an expression of rational technocratic efficiency applied to 
traffic flow but without consideration of the devastating impact it would 
have on neighborhoods in the South Bronx.32 Webber was known for his 
automobile-centric approach to urban design,33 however, and his 
paradigmatic example, in the early 1970s, of a failed large 
transportation project that could not be undone was the Bay Area Rapid 
Transit System.34 
Third, the tenth item on the list states that “the planner has no 
right to be wrong.”35 Where the previous two properties reflected 
technical characteristics of complex systems, this one reflects a political 
context in which the public is agitated, unforgiving, and prone to judge 
planners on only results with no credit for honest and skillful, but 
imperfect, efforts. 
The combination of a harshly judgmental and unforgiving public 
with an inability to learn from experience—either from working on 
previous wicked problems or from trial and error applied to the current 
one—dooms the planner to failure. Indeed, several policy analysts have 
declared that climate change “is a sort of ‘wicked problem’ that lacks 
anything resembling a solution.”36 This perspective leads many who 
 
 30. Id. at 162–63. 
 31. Id. at 163. 
 32. See CARO, supra note 23, at 885–94 (providing an in-depth description of the 
tremendously expensive construction of the Cross-Bronx Expressway). 
 33. Michael B. Teitz, Melvin Webber and the “Nonplace Urban Realm,” ACCESS, Winter 2006–
2007, at 29, 34 (“The continuing growth of suburbia and of automobile dominance also seems to 
bear out Mel Webber’s vision of what was important in shaping urban growth in the  
20th century.”). 
 34. Id. at 14; Melvin M. Webber, The Urban Place and the Nonplace Urban Realm, in 
EXPLORATIONS INTO URBAN STRUCTURE 79, 139–44 (Melvin M. Webber et al. eds., 1964); Melvin 
M. Webber, Order in Diversity: Community Without Propinquity, in CITIES AND SPACE: THE 
FUTURE USE OF URBAN LAND 23, 33–38 (Lowdon Wingo, Jr. ed., 1963).  
 35. Rittel & Webber, supra note 4, at 166–67. 
 36. ROGER PIELKE, JR., THE CLIMATE FIX: WHAT SCIENTISTS AND POLITICIANS WON’T TELL 
YOU ABOUT GLOBAL WARMING 122 (2010); see also MIKE HULME, WHY WE DISAGREE ABOUT 
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adopt it to seek to remove the wickedness with grand technological 
fixes, such as innovations that would make clean energy cheaper and 
easier to use than fossil fuels.37 
Critics of wickedness have commented at length about this 
dilemma of either responding to wickedness with a sense of defeat and 
paralysis or else looking for a grand technological fix that will render a 
wicked problem tame.38 Catrien Termeer, Art Dewulf, and Robbert 
Biesbroek ask, “Does the concept of wicked problems help policymakers 
deal with complex challenges or does it merely paralyse them?”39 
To escape this dilemma, the literature overwhelmingly focuses 
on addressing the irreducible uncertainty in predicting the impacts of 
interventions by working in small incremental steps, frequently 
invoking Lindblom’s “muddling through” approach.40 This approach 
suggests addressing the political challenges of poorly defined problem 
definitions and goals, and the high political cost of failure, by involving 
diverse stakeholders throughout the planning and response process. 
Incremental management of wicked problems allows midcourse 
adjustments to address both the technological uncertainty over whether 
an intervention will have the desired effect on the system and the 
challenge of maintaining public support for the chosen policy. It also 
 
CLIMATE CHANGE: UNDERSTANDING CONTROVERSY, INACTION AND OPPORTUNITY 336 (2009) 
(“[S]etting the overarching goal of humanity as the restabilisation of climate will, I believe, lead  
to disillusionment.”). 
 37. PIELKE, supra note 36, at 122; see also GWYN PRINS, ISABEL GALIANA, CHRISTOPHER 
GREEN, REINER GRUNDMANN, MIKE HULME, ATTE KORHOLA, FRANK LAIRD, TED NORDHAUS, 
ROGER PIELKE JNR, STEVE RAYNER, DANIEL SAREWITZ, MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER, NICO STEHR & 
HIROYUKI TEZUKA, THE HARTWELL PAPER: A NEW DIRECTION FOR CLIMATE POLICY AFTER THE 
CRASH OF 2009, at 5 (2010) [hereinafter PRINS ET AL., THE HARTWELL PAPER] (“The ultimate goal 
of doing this is to develop non-carbon energy supplies at unsubsidised costs less than those using 
fossil fuels.”). 
 38. See Catrien J.A.M. Termeer & Art Dewulf, A Small Wins Framework to Overcome the 
Evaluation Paradox of Governing Wicked Problems, 38 POL’Y & SOC’Y 298, 299 (2019) (“Paralysis 
occurs when people experience or define the wickedness as so overwhelming that it discourages 
them and prevents them from doing anything about it. . . . Overestimation is the belief that wicked 
problems can actually be solved, implying a focus on one aspect or a single standpoint.” (citations 
omitted)); see also Turnbull & Hoppe, supra note 11, at 317 (“Critics have commented that the 
wicked problem idea is too totalizing, unhelpfully resisting analysis and promoting an impossible 
idea of ‘success.’ ”). 
 39. Termeer et al., supra note 11, at 169. 
 40. See Levin et al., Overcoming the Tragedy, supra note 10, at 148 (suggesting an “applied 
forward reasoning approach” that focuses on “progressive incrementalism” to fight super wicked 
problems); Termeer & Dewulf, supra note 38, at 303 (arguing that an incremental framework that 
seeks “small wins” is especially effective at addressing wicked problems); Judith E. Innes & David 
E. Booher, Collaborative Rationality as a Strategy for Working with Wicked Problems, 154 
LANDSCAPE & URB. PLAN. 8, 9 (2016) (describing how “collaborative rationality” can make wicked 
problems more manageable by encouraging participants to set more realistic goals); Nancy 
Roberts, Wicked Problems and Network Approaches to Resolution, 1 INT’L PUB. MGMT. REV. 1, 15 
(2000) (suggesting that we “trust the process” and start taking steps toward a solution when faced 
with a wicked problem, rather than try to come up with the perfect solution before acting). 
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argues for including diverse participants to ensure that planners 
receive feedback about the political feasibility of proposed responses 
and about the public’s judgment of the results. 
This muddling through approach is only possible, however, if the 
most challenging—the wickedest—aspect of wicked problems is 
omitted: “Every solution to a wicked problem is a ‘one-shot operation’ ” 
with “no opportunity to learn by trial-and-error.”41 If we take this 
attribute of wickedness seriously, it rules out any opportunity for 
incremental management. 
When incremental management is not feasible, neither are the 
sort of technological fixes commonly invoked to render wicked problems 
tame. Daniel Sarewitz and Richard Nelson offer three rules  
for determining whether a societal problem is amenable to a 
technological fix: 
1. The technology must fit into a straightforward cause-and-
effect relationship that connects the problem to the solution. 
2. It must be possible to assess the incremental effects of the 
technology as it is deployed. 
3. The new technology itself must build incrementally upon an 
established base.42 
The influence of Sarewitz and Nelson’s analysis is illustrated by 
Roger Pielke, who draws on Sarewitz’s rules to argue that solar 
radiation management geoengineering (“SRM”) is not a good candidate 
for a technological fix to climate change because it cannot be 
implemented incrementally in small parts of the world and because the 
variability of the climate system will make it impossible to assess its 
effects unambiguously.43 Further, SRM fits the wicked criterion of being 
 
 41. Rittel & Webber, supra note 4, at 163. 
 42. Daniel Sarewitz & Richard Nelson, Three Rules for Technological Fixes, 456 NATURE 871, 
871–72 (2008). Sarewitz and Nelson address the feasibility of implementing a technological fix 
once it is chosen as a policy; assessing the political feasibility of enacting such a policy presents 
additional challenges outside the scope of Sarewitz and Nelson’s analysis. For these political 
considerations see, for example, Edward A. Parson, Climate Policymakers and Assessments Must 
Get Serious About Climate Engineering, 114 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 9227 (2017); Daniel Edward 
Callies, Institutional Legitimacy and Geoengineering Governance, 21 ETHICS, POL’Y & ENV’T 324 
(2018); JESSE L. REYNOLDS, THE GOVERNANCE OF SOLAR GEOENGINEERING: MANAGING CLIMATE 
CHANGE IN THE ANTHROPOCENE (2019); Simon Nicholson, Sikina Jinnah & Alexander Gillespie, 
Solar Radiation Management: A Proposal for Immediate Polycentric Governance, 18 CLIMATE 
POL’Y 322 (2018); and Sarah Burch, Aarti Gupta, Cristina Y.A. Inoue, Agni Kalfagianni, Åsa 
Persson, Andrea K. Gerlak, Atsushi Ishii, James Patterson, Jonathan Pickering, Michelle Scobie, 
Jeroen Van der Heijden, Joost Vervoort, Carolina Adler, Michael Bloomfield, Riyanti Djalante, 
John Dryzek, Victor Galaz, Christopher Gordon, Renée Harmon, Sikina Jinnah, Rakhyun E. Kim, 
Lennart Olsson, Judith Van Leeuwen, Vasna Ramasar, Paul Wapner & Ruben Zondervan, New 
Directions in Earth System Governance Research, EARTH SYS. GOVERNANCE, Jan. 2019, at 1. 
 43. See PIELKE, supra note 36, at 130–32. 
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irreversible once it has been implemented,44 which we discuss at greater 
length below. 
If technological fixes require incrementalism, then a truly 
wicked problem—one in which any intervention fundamentally and 
irreversibly changes the system so that learning from trial and error is 
impossible—is not suitable for any technological fix. Thus, a strict 
reading of Rittel and Webber’s criteria leaves no escape from  
policy paralysis. 
II. PARALYSIS AND THE RHETORIC OF REACTION 
Rittel and Webber’s writing betrays a nostalgia for planning by 
mathematical optimization, wherein the goals are clear and 
quantifiable, and the planner can develop an optimal solution within 
the relevant constraints. They portray the challenge of wicked problems 
as almost entirely due to the messiness of human nature and human 
behavior: behavior is not predictable or manipulable the way that 
physical objects and chemical reactions are. Preferences are changeable 
and inconsistent.  
But it is well established that individual and collective human 
behavior is far more complex than Newtonian physics,45 so critics 
remark that if wickedness is just a synonym for the presence of human 
behavior and values, then there is nothing distinctive in wickedness: 
“[T]he wicked/tame problem distinction is simply the old false 
distinction between social and natural sciences, rewritten in the 
language of policy and planning.”46  
A great deal of the literature expands on Rittel and Webber by 
adding nuance to the wicked/tame distinction. Rather than declaring 
problems to be categorically wicked or tame, many authors assess 
 
 44. For articles discussing the irreversibility of SRM, see, for example, Florian Rabitz, 
Governing the Termination Problem in Solar Radiation Management, 28 ENV’T POL. 502 (2019); 
Catriona McKinnon, Sleepwalking into Lock-In? Avoiding Wrongs to Future People in the 
Governance of Solar Radiation Management Research, 28 ENV’T POL. 441 (2019); Andy Parker & 
Peter J. Irvine, The Risk of Termination Shock from Solar Geoengineering, 6 EARTH’S FUTURE 456 
(2018); and Alan Robock, Allison Marquardt, Ben Kravitz & Georgiy Stenchikov, Benefits, Risks, 
and Costs of Stratospheric Geoengineering, 36 GEOPHYSICAL RSCH. LETTERS L19703 (2009). 
 45. See Weinberg, supra note 3, at 212–13 (describing the complexity of human behavior and 
the difficulty of studying it); Rittel & Webber, supra note 4, at 160–67 (explaining what makes 
problems related to human behavior more complex than problems based in mathematics and 
Newtonian physics). 
 46. Turnbull & Hoppe, supra note 11, at 318 (emphasis omitted); see also Noordegraaf et al., 
supra note 12, at 290–91 (describing the ways in which the practical limits on trust and 
collaboration tend to tame wicked problems by fragmenting opposition rather than by  
building consensus). 
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degrees of wickedness or qualitatively distinct types of wickedness.47 If 
we start removing the distinctive criteria for wickedness, however, then 
it becomes harder to distinguish wicked problems from many of the 
other bits of jargon cited at the beginning of this Article, such as “trans-
science” and “post-normal science.” And where Rittel and Webber did 
not offer any guidance to applying the wicked problem concept to 
planning and policymaking, most of the authors of those other terms 
accompanied them with descriptions of how they could be applied in 
practice. To the extent that the distinctive characteristics of wickedness 
are watered down, it becomes less clear why the wicked problems 
framework is more useful than many other approaches to addressing 
tough planning and policy problems. 
Experts are adding sophistication and nuance to the concept of 
wickedness, such as treating wickedness as a matter of degree rather 
than dichotomy. This literature also adds the concept of 
superwickedness for wicked problems that have additional constraints, 
including urgency driven by the fact that any delay makes the problem 
much harder to manage.48 But a great deal of discourse, especially 
around climate change, continues to use Rittel and Webber’s 
dichotomous treatment. 
When a severe problem cannot be solved, when incremental 
management cannot learn by trial and error, and when time is running 
out, it is natural to feel paralyzed and defeated. A great deal of work on 
wicked problems addresses the danger of paralysis.49 But outside the 
realm of specialists in planning and policy analysis, wickedness is often 
used rhetorically to argue against taking forceful measures or to make 
such actions seem futile or unattainable.  
Examples of this rhetorical turn include Frank Incropera, who 
writes that the wicked nature of climate change means that “nothing 
less than a global sea change in cultural and behavioral norms” is 
sufficient to prevent the situation from becoming “hopeless.”50 Mike 
Hulme does not say that it is futile to address climate change but argues 
that the wickedness of climate change implies that “setting the 
overarching goal of humanity as the restabilisation of climate 
 
 47. On degrees of wickedness, see, for example, Termeer et al., supra note 11, at 171–72; 
Brian W. Head & John Alford, Wicked Problems: Implications for Public Policy and Management, 
47 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 711, 712 (2015). On qualitatively distinct types of wickedness, see, for example, 
Peters & Tarpey, supra note 15, at 223. 
 48. See Lazarus, supra note 10, at 1160 (identifying climate change as a “super wicked 
problem”); Levin et al., Playing It Forward, supra note 10, at 502002 (noting that climate change 
poses such great policy challenges that it should be classified as a super wicked problem). 
 49. See, e.g., Termeer & Dewulf, supra note 38. 
 50. FRANK P. INCROPERA, CLIMATE CHANGE: A WICKED PROBLEM 15 (2015). 
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will . . . lead to disillusionment.”51 Hulme further quotes Scott 
Hamilton, who writes that any attempt to govern or control climate 
change directly is fundamentally “broken, thereby engendering failure 
in a Sisyphean quest to fix what is conceptually unfixable.”52  
Atul Gawande observed a similar line of argument in U.S. 
healthcare policy where the wickedness of public health policy is used 
to support a “rhetoric of intransigence” that opposes any proposed 
reform on the ground that it cannot work.53 This suggests that the 
paralytic, defeatist aspects of the wicked problem paradigm may not be 
accidental. Rather than resulting unintentionally from a poor choice of 
analysis framework, the paralysis may be a desired outcome that 
motivates the choice to invoke wickedness.  
Gawande connects the use of wickedness in justifying 
intransigence to a set of rhetorical tropes that A.O. Hirschman observed 
being deployed repeatedly through history to argue against the 
extension of citizenship to encompass all members of a nation.54 Over 
the course of more than two centuries, proposals to expand the concept 
of citizenship to be more inclusive were frequently met with objections. 
These objections followed three distinct rhetorical tropes that 
Hirschman labeled futility, perversity, and jeopardy.55  
Futility arguments assert that proposed reforms will achieve 
nothing.56 Michael Moore and Jeff Gibb’s recent movie Planet of the 
Humans echoed fringe policy analysts in arguing that using renewable 
energy to fight greenhouse gas emissions was futile and would cause 
just as much environmental damage as fossil fuels.57 Another common 
use of futility is to argue that nothing the United States does to reduce 
 
 51. HULME, supra note 36, at 336. 
 52. MIKE HULME, WEATHERED: CULTURES OF CLIMATE 141 (Robert Rojek ed., 2017) 
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Scott Hamilton, The Global Climate Has Always Been Broken: 
Failures of Climate Governance as Global Governmentality, 5 CAUCASUS INT’L 141, 141 (2015)). 
 53. See Atul Gawande, Something Wicked This Way Comes, NEW YORKER (June 28, 2012), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/something-wicked-this-way-comes 
[https://perma.cc/2HV3-NTDW]. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERSITY, FUTILITY, 
JEOPARDY 7 (1991). 
 56. Id. at 43. 
 57. PLANET OF THE HUMANS (Rumble Media & Huron Mountain Films 2019); see also Fact 
Check Bible, PLANET OF THE HUMS., https://planetofthehumans.com/fact-check-bible/ (last visited 
Sept. 18, 2020) [https://perma.cc/3R6H-MD7D] (claiming that “renewable energy could become as 
destructive as fossil fuels” (quoting Jason Hickel, The Limits of Clean Energy, FOREIGN POL’Y: 
(Sept. 6, 2019, 8:51 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/06/the-path-to-clean-energy-will-be-
very-dirty-climate-change-renewables/ [https://perma.cc/ZKE9-YV7Q])). 
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its greenhouse gas emissions will matter so long as China does not also 
dramatically curtail its own emissions.58 
Perversity arguments go further and assert that the reforms will 
be worse than ineffectual: “everything backfires,” so attempts to 
improve conditions will make them worse.59 This argument often turns 
up in climate policy discussions as a variation on Jevons’s paradox: as 
technology becomes more energy efficient, energy consumption will rise 
because people get more value for every kilowatt hour they consume.60 
One such analysis predicted that as energy-efficient solid-state lighting 
became prevalent, residential electricity consumption for lighting 
would rise almost two-fold.61 In fact, this pessimism was unwarranted, 
and as solid-state lighting became prevalent, residential electricity 
consumption dropped.62 
Finally, jeopardy arguments assert that the reform can only be 
realized at the cost of “endanger[ing] some previous, precious 
accomplishment.”63 A frequent application of this to climate change 
policy is the claim that the cost of significantly reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions would imperil economic growth and thus throw great 
numbers into poverty or that global limits on fossil fuel consumption 
would threaten economic growth in poor nations and trap them in 
permanent poverty.64 
 
 58. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Climate Change: The China Problem, 81 S. CALIF. L. REV. 
905, 906–10 (2008) (discussing climate mitigation opponents’ use of Chinese emissions as a reason 
not to reduce emissions in the United States). 
 59. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 55, at 11–12. 
 60. See Blake Alcott, Jevons’ Paradox, 54 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 9, 11 (2005). 
 61. See J.Y. Tsao, H.D. Saunders, J.R. Creighton, M.E. Coltrin & J.A. Simmons, Solid-State 
Lighting: An Energy-Economics Perspective, J. PHYSICS D: APPLIED PHYSICS, Sept. 8, 2010, at 8 
tbl.1 (showing an increase in per capita electricity consumption for residential lighting from 0.42 
to 0.76 megawatt hours per person per year if the real cost of electricity remains constant). 
 62. See Lucas W. Davis, Evidence of a Decline in Electricity Use by U.S. Households, 37 ECON. 
BULL. 1098, 1098 (2017) (finding a six percent decrease in per capita residential electricity 
consumption from 2010 to 2015); Jonathan M. Gilligan & Michael P. Vandenbergh, A Framework 
for Assessing the Impact of Private Climate Governance, ENERGY RSCH. & SOC. SCI., Feb. 2020, at 
2–3 (discussing the recent drop in per capita residential energy consumption); see also Kenneth 
Gillingham, Matthew J. Kotchen, David S. Rapson & Gernot Wagner, The Rebound Effect Is 
Overplayed, 493 NATURE 475, 476 (2013) (reviewing studies on energy efficiency and noting that 
“rebound effects are small and are therefore no excuse for inaction”). 
 63. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 55, at 7. 
 64. See Christiana Figueres & Benjamin Zycher, Can We Tackle Both Climate Change and 
COVID-19 Recovery?, FIN. TIMES (May 6, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/9e832c8a-8961-11ea-
a109-483c62d17528 [https://perma.cc/GVJ8-ML3N] (“Inexpensive energy is necessary for 
economic advancement by the world’s poor and for recovery from the staggering economic effects 
of Covid-19. Ideological opposition to fossil fuels is an anti-human stance . . . Prioritising climate 
policy will harm the ability of most people to improve their conditions . . . .”); see also BJORN 
LOMBORG, COOL IT: THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST’S GUIDE TO GLOBAL WARMING 157 
(Vintage Books 2d ed. 2010) (describing the harms that can come if too much focus is placed on 
cutting CO2 emissions). 
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For someone attempting to block progress, the wicked problem 
paradigm provides a rich source of futility, perversity, and jeopardy 
arguments. The lack of a definitive statement of the problem or the 
criteria for a solution, the lack of tests for evaluating the performance 
of an attempted solution, and the inability to apply lessons learned in 
managing other problems all contribute to a sense of futility. The one-
shot nature of solutions and the way they irreversibly transform the 
nature of the problem contribute to perversity and jeopardy. And the 
fact that any wicked problem is itself only the symptom of a deeper 
wicked problem can feed further jeopardy arguments that solving one 
problem will only make another, deeper one worse. 
These connections are worrying enough in the hands of someone 
intent on obstructing progress, but they can be just as problematic in 
good-faith planning efforts. In a separate essay, Hirschman examined 
case studies of failed economic development projects and observed that 
theoretical paradigms often give rise to “compulsive and mindless 
theorizing,” which can badly derail good-faith planning because they 
can provide so many possible explanations for failure that failure comes 
to seem overdetermined and success impossible.65 The wicked problem 
paradigm can be particularly seductive and dangerous in this way, 
which is why so many writers have cautioned against the temptation to 
“throw up our hands” when confronted with a wicked problem.66  
Hirschman observes that there can be some comfort or relief in 
throwing up one’s hands and declaring defeat: “[W]ouldn’t it be 
reassuring if a society that has been unable to meet some standard of 
social justice . . . were ipso facto condemned to economic stagnation and 
deterioration? For that very reason we should be rather on our guard 
against any theory purporting to prove what would be so reassuring.”67 
If a project is doomed to fail regardless of what one does, then there is 
no need to try hard or to feel badly about failure. 
To avoid facile declarations of failure, Hirschman proposes a rule 
that “anyone who believes he has discovered a new obstacle to 
development is under an obligation to look for ways in which this 
obstacle can be overcome . . . .”68 To this end, “he who looks for large-
scale social change must be possessed . . . by ‘the passion for what is 
 
 65. See Albert O. Hirschman, The Search for Paradigms as a Hindrance to Understanding, 
22 WORLD POL. 329, 329 (1970) (emphasis omitted). 
 66. See, e.g., Innes & Booher, supra note 40, at 8 (“Experts do not have workable answers to 
wicked problems. Nonetheless wicked problems are the norm in planning, and we cannot throw 
up our hands. . . . As planners we have to find ways to improve the situation, to untangle knots, 
and to end paralysis around important issues.”). 
 67. Hirschman, supra note 65, at 337. 
 68. Id. at 340. 
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possible’ rather than rely on what has been certified as probable by 
factor analysis.”69 
In 1973, Rittel and Webber’s caution against technocratic 
arrogance was fitting and useful. But as Kelly Levin and Richard 
Lazarus emphasized in introducing the concept of superwickedness, the 
pressing and messy problems of the early twenty-first century, such as 
climate change, have the additional attribute of urgency because failure 
to take prompt action will severely constrain the options available at a 
later time.70 The political rhetoric around climate policy has produced 
greater partisan polarization in the United States than exists for any 
other topic.71 A significant contributor to this polarization has been a 
concerted and well-funded political disinformation campaign to 
discourage and confuse the public.72 The rhetoric of wickedness can be 
exercised both cynically by those who wish to obstruct action and 
sincerely by those who wish to understand the failure to make political 
progress. In today’s fraught political climate, sincere and cynical uses 
alike can deepen the type of paralysis and political gridlock that 
Hirschman feared. 
III. ESCAPING PARALYSIS 
The paralyzing nature of wicked problems arises in large part 
from the ten-point list in Rittel and Webber’s original paper.73 These 
 
 69. Id. at 343. 
 70. For more on this messiness see, for example, Lazarus, supra note 10; Levin et al., Playing 
It Forward, supra note 10. 
 71. See PEW RSCH. CTR., AS ECONOMIC CONCERNS RECEDE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
RISES ON THE PUBLIC’S POLICY AGENDA 6 (2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/wp-content/ 
uploads/sites/4/2020/02/PP_2020.02.13_Political-Priorities_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8LF-
VF6Q] (showing that seventy-eight percent of Democrats believe that climate change should be a 
policy priority, while only twenty-one percent of Republicans share this sentiment); see also Oliver 
Milman, Climate Crisis More Politically Polarizing than Abortion for US Voters, Study Finds, 
GUARDIAN (May 22, 2019, 1:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/may/21/climate-
crisis-more-politically-polarizing-than-abortion-for-us-voters-study-finds [https://perma.cc/C5NG-
XJZ8] (discussing a Yale University study that showed climate change to be more polarizing than 
“traditionally divisive topics such as abortion and gun control”); ANTHONY LEISEROWITZ, EDWARD 
MAIBACH, SETH ROSENTHAL & JOHN KOTCHER, POLITICS & GLOBAL WARMING 9 (2019), 
https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/publications/politics-global-warming-april-2019/ [https:// 
perma.cc/LL2C-FQ33] (noting the difference in the amount of concern about climate change among 
Democrats and Republicans). 
 72. For more information on this campaign, see, for example, NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. 
CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A HANDFUL OF SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES 
FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO GLOBAL WARMING (2010); Myanna Lahsen, Technocracy, Democracy, 
and U.S. Climate Politics: The Need for Demarcations, 30 SCI., TECH. & HUM. VALUES 137 (2005); 
Heather Douglas, Bullshit at the Interface of Science and Policy: Global Warming, Toxic 
Substances, and Other Pesky Problems, in BULLSHIT AND PHILOSOPHY 215 (Gary L. Hardcastle & 
George A. Reisch eds., 2006). 
 73. See Rittel & Webber, supra note 4, at 161–67. 
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ten criteria are repeated in a large fraction of subsequent papers on 
wicked problems. They feed directly into Hirschman’s observation that 
a rich theoretical paradigm can easily generate so many reasons why a 
project can fail that failure comes to seem not only inevitable but 
overdetermined, so if one reason for failure is removed, many more 
remain to seal its doom.74 
If we apply Rittel and Webber’s list of criteria rigidly, then 
wicked problems are not merely unsolvable (in the sense of coming to a 
definitive resolution), but they are intractable, meaning there is 
nothing a planner can do with even a little confidence in achieving 
minor improvements. This is truly a paralyzing situation, and to escape 
it, almost all analysts relax the fifth criterion, which states that there 
is no opportunity to learn by trial and error because any operation 
inevitably and irreversibly transforms the problem into something very 
different.75 With this criterion relaxed, incremental progress becomes 
possible and the planner has a way forward. 
A. Muddling Through as an Alternative to the Paralysis of Wickedness 
All incremental approaches to wicked problems, however, owe a 
great debt to Lindblom’s pioneering work on what he described as 
“muddling through.”76 Lindblom did not attempt to define a new class 
of problem but rather began from the observation that virtually all 
policymaking and planning involves messy and complex systems that 
blend the technical with the human, the social, and the political. And 
where Rittel and Webber focused on building a theoretical framework 
for describing intractable problems, Lindblom focused on what a 
planner or policymaker can realistically do and emphasized methods of 
bounded rationality. Indeed, once the criteria of wickedness that 
blocked incremental management are removed, many of the remaining 
criteria become very amenable to satisficing or other established 
methods for addressing decisionmaking under a combination of 
 
 74. See Hirschman, supra note 65, at 339–40 (describing the effects of this  
theoretical paradigm). 
 75. See, e.g., Termeer et al., supra note 11, at 170 (observing that “the majority of wicked 
problem scholars have attempted to reduce the 10 criteria to a smaller number of distinguishing 
characteristics”); B. Guy Peters, What Is So Wicked About Wicked Problems? A Conceptual 
Analysis and Research Program, 36 POL’Y & SOC’Y 385, 388–90 (2017) (observing that “some 
problems, or interventions, may indeed be reversible and even forgettable once other attempts at 
a solution have been offered”); Lazarus, supra note 10, at 1180, 1193 (“Environmental law must 
be flexible and responsive to new information” and “[t]he requirements of federal climate change 
legislation have to be steadfast or ‘sticky’ in some respects and flexible in others . . . .”). 
 76. See Lindblom, Muddling Through, supra note 24 (introducing the concept of “muddling 
through”); Lindblom, Still Muddling, supra note 24 (expanding on his earlier analysis). 
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uncertainty and limited cognitive resources,77 and the remaining 
criteria merely describe politics as it has ever been: an attempt to build 
working agreements among people with different values and priorities. 
This leads us to ask whether the wicked problem paradigm is 
valuable. In its strict application, all wicked problems are utterly 
intractable, and in a looser application, it does not seem to offer any 
distinctive insights that Lindblom did not achieve earlier and more 
pragmatically. Indeed, Lindblom’s “muddling through” approach is 
frequently cited in the literature of incremental approaches to  
wicked problems.78 
Nevertheless, we need not see Rittel and Webber’s ideas as being 
in conflict with Lindblom’s. The insights developed in both lines of work 
are valuable and far from trivial. There is a reason why variations on 
them are regularly reinvented or rediscovered, as we observed at the 
beginning of this Article. And even today, one of the great obstacles to 
making progress on climate policy is the persistent confusion among 
many activists and many scientists over why climate change policy 
cannot be effectively derived from scientific understanding of the 
physical climate system.79 
As many scholars of science policy have observed, climate 
change fits many criteria of wickedness because there are so many 
 
 77. See, e.g., Herbert A. Simon, Theories of Bounded Rationality, in DECISION AND 
ORGANIZATION 161 (C.B. McGuire & Roy Radner eds., 1st ed. 1972) (describing satisficing and 
other methods for decisionmaking in the face of uncertainty); Herbert A. Simon, Theories of 
Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioral Science, 49 AM. ECON. REV. 253, 257–62 (1959) 
(discussing how the theory of utility, among other methods, can be used to make decisions under 
uncertain parameters). 
 78. See, e.g., Termeer & Dewulf, supra note 38, at 302; Falk Daviter, Coping, Taming or 
Solving: Alternative Approaches to the Governance of Wicked Problems, 38 POL’Y STUD. 571, 580 
(2017); Emery Roe, Policy Messes and Their Management, 49 POL’Y SCIS. 351, 352 (2016); Steven 
Ney & Marco Verweij, Messy Institutions for Wicked Problems: How to Generate Clumsy Solutions?, 
33 ENV’T & PLAN. C: GOV’T & POL’Y 1679, 1684 (2015); Head & Alford, supra note 47, at 719; Levin 
et al., Overcoming the Tragedy, supra note 10, at 131; Roberts, supra note 40, at 15. 
 79. See HULME, supra note 36, at 74:  
Implicit in this appeal to science as the basis for a lobbying campaign is that science 
has the authority to make definitive and universal statements about what is and what 
is not dangerous for people and societies and, ultimately, for the world. Science is being 
used to justify claims not merely about how the world is (what are called ‘positive’ 
statements), but about what is or is not desirable - about how the world should be 
(‘normative’ statements); 
PIELKE, supra note 36, at 149: 
Not only does the notion of “dangerous interference” [in the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change] compel science to serve as the arbiter of what 
ultimately are political considerations that science cannot resolve, but it is inconsistent 
with how the climate in all of its complexity actually affects society . . . .; 
SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AND PUBLIC REASON 155 (2012) (“One looks in vain for explicit 
acknowledgment that expert deliberations are a site of hybrid judgment, combining technical and 
normative considerations.”). 
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different aspects to climate and to the ways in which it is changing. In 
addition, there are simultaneously so many different preferences and 
priorities about what climatic conditions are better or worse than others 
that there is no definitive statement of what the climate change 
problem is.80 Attempts to develop policy for managing climate change 
often begin with a negotiation among stakeholders about what the goals 
should be. In a pluralistic society, agreement about goals can be difficult 
to achieve even in the best circumstances, and under the current 
atmosphere of hostile partisan polarization in the United States, this 
task is especially difficult.81 
Even when the goals of policy are established, the means for 
pursuing them are additional sources of conflict and dissension. 
Lindblom observed that the distinction between means and ends breaks 
down for complex policy issues: values and preferences are contingent 
and context-dependent rather than absolute, so they cannot be treated 
separately from the context of the policies under consideration.82 
Especially in the United States, ideological and partisan divisions over 
the role of government regulation, principally at the federal level, 
contribute to political gridlock over many issues, especially 
environmental ones.83 Psychological effects contribute to this by 
creating an ideological dimension to what people believe about purely 
factual and scientific matters. One powerful example of this is solution 
aversion, where people who are told that the solution to a problem 
requires actions that they find ideologically repugnant often respond by 
denying that the scientific basis of the problem exists.84 Thus, people 
who are strongly ideologically opposed to government regulation tend 
 
 80. See HULME, supra note 52, at 142 (“With global climate as an object of governance, 
climate-change cannot but be an idea which mobilises powerful actors in pursuit of their different 
interests.”); PIELKE, supra note 36, at 143 (“[T]he main scientific and policy institutions responsible 
for climate change in the international arena do not even agree on what the phrase ‘climate change’ 
actually means.”). 
 81. See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jonathan M. Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock, 40 COLUM. J. 
ENV’T L. 217, 233–37 (2015) (noting the political and institutional barriers to public action on 
climate change). 
 82. Lindblom, Muddling Through, supra note 24, at 83. 
 83. See MICHAEL P. VANDENBERGH & JONATHAN M. GILLIGAN, BEYOND POLITICS: THE 
PRIVATE GOVERNANCE RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 18 (2017); see also LEISEROWITZ ET AL., 
supra note 71 discussing public opinion polls on climate change topics among different political 
affiliations); PEW RSCH. CTR., supra note 71 (documenting partisan public opinion divide on 
climate change); Riley E. Dunlap, Aaron M. McCright & Jerrod H. Yarosh, The Political Divide on 
Climate Change: Partisan Polarization Widens in the U.S., 58 ENV’T: SCI. & POL’Y FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEV., no. 5, 2016, at 4, 14–19 (2016) (analyzing data showing increased partisan 
polarization on environmental issues). 
 84. See Troy H. Campbell & Aaron C. Kay, Solution Aversion: On the Relation Between 
Ideology and Motivated Disbelief, 107 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 809, 820–21 (2014) (showing 
correlation between respondents’ ideological aversion to a proposed solution to a problem and their 
willingness to recognize the existence of the problem itself). 
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to deny the scientific facts of climate change.85 We see this in Senator 
James Inhofe’s statement that “I assumed like everybody else, way back 
when everyone was talking about global warming and all that, I 
assumed that that was probably right, until I found out what it was 
going to cost.”86 
B. Oblique Strategies as Alternatives to the Paralysis of Wickedness 
Presenting a panoply of means to achieve policy goals on climate 
change, such as reducing greenhouse gas emissions, may serve an 
important function in defusing solution aversion and other 
psychological barriers to reaching agreements about policy. As to goals, 
Mike Hulme and Roger Pielke offer an “oblique” alternative to 
achieving consensus about goals: they advocate focusing on identifying 
policy actions that can address a diverse set of goals.87 This relates to 
Cass Sunstein’s concept of “incompletely theorized agreements,” in 
which people with very different goals and values can nonetheless agree 
on an action to take, while disagreeing about the reasons for taking the 
action.88 Pielke couches this in a paraphrase of Walter Lippmann: 
“[T]he goal of politics is not to get everyone to think alike but, rather, to 
get people who think differently to act alike.”89 
One example of this oblique approach is an intensive research 
and development program to produce clean energy technology that can 
scale up to the utility level and be cheaper than fossil fuels.90 Some 
 
 85. See id. at 821 (linking solution aversion findings to views on climate change issues). 
 86. Inhofe has repeated this statement multiple times, see, for example, Energy and Climate 
Policy Summit, Senator James Inhofe and Corbin Robertson, C-SPAN (DEC. 8, 2016), 
https://www.c-span.org/video/?419785-3/senator-james-inhofe-discusses-energy-policy [https:// 
perma.cc/R69B-648Z]; Jeanne Cummings, Transcript: Interview with Sen. Jim Inhofe, POLITICO 
(Apr. 19, 2010, 10:32 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/stories/0410/35971.html [https://perma 
.cc/494G-8WZU]. 
 87. See MIKE HULME, CAN SCIENCE FIX CLIMATE CHANGE?: A CASE AGAINST CLIMATE 
ENGINEERING 117 (2014) (“[T]he task [of climate policy] is to find the ‘soft underbelly’ of climate 
change, to find oblique policies that advance human welfare while at the same time delivering 
outcomes consistent with the goal of minimizing climatic risks.”); PIELKE, supra note 36, at 222 
(“Paradoxical as it sounds, goals are more likely to be achieved when pursued indirectly . . . . 
Oblique approaches are most effective in difficult terrain, or where outcomes depend on 
interactions with other people . . . . Obliquity is characteristic of systems that are complex, 
imperfectly understood, and change their nature as we engage with them.” (quoting John Kay, 
Obliquity, JOHN KAY (Jan. 17, 2004), https://www.johnkay.com/2004/01/17/obliquity/ [https:// 
perma.cc/T6E4-USBC])); PRINS ET AL., THE HARTWELL PAPER, supra note 37, at 9 (“If one seeks 
long-lasting impact, the best line of approach may not be head-on.”). 
 88. Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733,  
1735–36 (1995). 
 89. PIELKE, supra note 36, at 44–45. 
 90. HULME, supra note 87, at 127–28; PIELKE, supra note 36, at 222; PRINS ET AL., THE 
HARTWELL PAPER, supra note 36, at 5. 
          
2020] COMPLEX SYSTEMS AND CLIMATE CHANGE 1797 
people may want clean cheap energy because it reduces greenhouse gas 
emissions. Others may want it because it reduces local and regional 
particulate matter pollution. Others may want it because it contributes 
to the nation’s energy security or simply because it costs less than fossil 
fuels. And still others may want it for the jobs it creates. People with 
these different views can agree on a policy that would significantly 
reduce the rate of global warming by curtailing greenhouse gas 
emissions without needing to agree on goals for climate change. 
Such a policy, however, would not address a critical aspect of 
what makes climate change not merely wicked, but superwicked: the 
time factor. This policy approach may also underestimate the power of 
political opposition from economic sectors, such as the fossil fuel 
industry, that would suffer from a transition to clean energy.91 It may 
also underestimate the importance of entrenched ideological  
opposition to clean energy.92 The latter obstacle is not distinctive to 
wicked or superwicked problems, but it characterizes many  
political controversies.  
The time problem is central to superwicked problems, though, 
especially climate change, and thus merits further examination. 
Greenhouse gases are stock pollutants, so climate change depends not 
just on the current level of emissions but on the cumulative emissions 
since the industrial revolution.93 The world is rapidly approaching a 
quantity of cumulative emissions that will raise the planet’s 
temperature by 2°C, and once we cross that threshold, limiting 
warming to 2°C will be impossible without new technology to actively 
remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.94 Any delay in rapidly 
 
 91. See, e.g., Stanley Reed, Oil Companies Ponder Climate Change, but Profits Still Rule, N.Y. 
TIMES (last updated Oct. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/07/business/energy-
environment/oil-companies-climate-change-profits.html [https://perma.cc/2SQ7-96HP] (reporting 
that despite acknowledging the dangers of global warming, oil and gas companies prioritize their 
profits and “argue[] that it would be a mistake to force well-run companies to reduce their oil and 
gas production”). 
 92. See, e.g., Brad Plumer, Trump Orders a Lifeline for Struggling Coal and Nuclear Plants, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/climate/trump-coal-nuclear-
power.html [https://perma.cc/FT4S-2FLG] (reporting that “President Trump has ordered Energy 
Secretary Rick Perry to ‘prepare immediate steps’ to stop the closing of unprofitable coal and 
nuclear plants around the country” even though this would “force consumers to pay more  
for electricity.”). 
 93. See DAVID G. VICTOR, GLOBAL WARMING GRIDLOCK: CREATING MORE EFFECTIVE 
STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING THE PLANET 3–4 (2011) (“CO2 lingers in the atmosphere for a century 
or longer, which is why climate policy experts call it a ‘stock pollutant.’ ”); see also H. Damon 
Matthews, Nathan P. Gillett, Peter A. Stott & Kirsten Zickfeld, The Proportionality of Global 
Warming to Cumulative Carbon Emissions, 459 NATURE 829, 829–32 (2009) (analyzing the 
relationship between climate change and cumulative carbon emissions). 
 94. See Thomas F. Stocker, The Closing Door of Climate Targets, 339 SCIENCE 280, 280–82 
(2013) (explaining that as cumulative carbon emissions increase, the likelihood of achieving 
climate targets through mitigation decreases); see also David J. Frame, Adrian H. Macey & Myles 
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reducing greenhouse gas emissions threatens our ability to meet a goal 
of stabilizing the planet’s temperature at no more than 2°C above the 
preindustrial climate. Accounting for this time factor makes it 
especially important to avoid paralysis and thus requires us to return 
and reconsider from a new perspective the irreversible nature of actions 
to manage wicked problems. 
IV. IRREVERSIBILITY AND FORKS IN THE ROAD 
A. Opportunity Costs and Irreversibility Under Status Quo 
The original definition of wicked problems includes the  
criterion that 
[e]very solution to a wicked problem is a “one-shot operation”; because there is no 
opportunity to learn by trial-and-error, every attempt counts significantly . . . . [E]very 
implemented solution . . . leaves “traces” that cannot be undone. . . . And every attempt to 
reverse a decision or to correct for undesired consequences poses another set of wicked 
problems, which are in turn subject to the same dilemmas.95 
Some possible responses to climate change entail these kinds of 
irreversible consequences. Geoengineering by solar radiation 
management is an important example because it is subject to 
potentially catastrophic “termination shock”: the geoengineering 
project requires constant renewal of stratospheric aerosol injection, and 
if this ceases, the climate will warm very rapidly as the aerosols 
precipitate out of the atmosphere.96 Warming that otherwise would 
have taken many decades will occur over a few years, and the final 
temperature might even be higher than it would have been under the 
same emissions scenario if the geoengineering project had never 
begun.97 A less dramatic example would be a decision to replace fossil 
fuels in the energy supply with certain clean-energy technologies. Path 
dependence and lock-in effects are commonly seen in technological 
innovation, and after developing one set of clean-energy technologies, 
these effects can make it difficult and expensive to switch to different 
 
R. Allen, Cumulative Emissions and Climate Policy, 7 NAT. GEOSCIENCE 692, 692–93 (2014) 
(emphasizing the utility of cumulative emissions analysis in making and evaluating the efficacy 
climate change policy).  
 95. Rittel & Webber, supra note 4, at 163. 
 96. See Parker & Irvine, supra note 44, at 456–57 (explaining the concept of “termination 
shock” as it relates to changes in the deployment of solar geoengineering). 
 97. See Rabitz, supra note 44, at 503–04 (describing studies that detail the potentially 
extreme effects of abrupt SRM termination); McKinnon, supra note 44, at 447 (suggesting abrupt 
suspension of SRM deployment could produce a swift return to pre-deployment temperatures); 
Parker & Irvine, supra note 44, at 458 (noting how accelerated warming occurs in the event of 
termination shock); see also Robock et al., supra note 44, at 5–8 (discussing a variety of SRM-
related risks and costs). 
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clean-energy technologies.98 Some contributing factors to path 
dependence and lock-in are investments in creating expertise in 
particular technologies; establishing a manufacturing base and 
associated supply chains; and training a skilled workforce to produce, 
distribute, install, operate, and maintain the new technologies. 
Changing course to focus on different technologies would, to a great 
extent, require starting over on all these requirements. This is 
especially true if one set of technologies applies to centralized large-
scale generation and the other to distributed small-scale generation.99 
In addition to technological effects, regulatory law and policy can create 
additional path dependencies and lock-in.100 Planning cities for 
autonomous electric cars would make it difficult to change course later 
to expanding mass transportation if autonomous vehicles do not  
pan out.101 
These consequences appear to be more the exception than the 
rule, however. Indeed, market-based carbon-pricing regulatory 
instruments are attractive in part because, at least in theory, the 
carbon price or the number of permits issued can be easily adjusted in 
response to new information about climate change and about supply-
and-demand schedules for energy. Research and development policies 
to encourage innovation in new clean-energy technologies can 
encompass a wide variety of technologies, and energy markets can 
easily accommodate many entrants, allowing different technologies to 
find niches where they have competitive advantages (e.g., solar energy 
may be more competitive in locations that have little cloud cover and 
where the seasonal and diurnal demand is higher at times when 
incident sunlight is most intense; whereas, wind energy may be more 
 
 98. See Roger Fouquet, Path Dependence in Energy Systems and Economic Development, 1 
NAT. ENERGY, July 11, 2016, at 1–5, (discussing the lock-in effect and path dependence of clean 
energy innovation and development); Jürgen Essletzbichler, Renewable Energy Technology and 
Path Creation: A Multi-scalar Approach to Energy Transition in the UK, 20 EUR. PLAN. STUD. 791, 
794 (2012) (addressing the existing lock-in and path dependence of the UK energy sector). 
 99. Fouquet, supra note 98, at 1–5 (emphasizing the economic and technological factors that 
contribute to energy development lock-in and the difficulties they pose for downstream changes  
in policy). 
 100. See Amy L. Stein, Breaking Energy Path Dependencies, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 559, 559–61 
(2016) (explaining how the “institutional stickiness” of energy regulations contributes to  
path dependence). 
 101. See ROBERT CERVERO, ERICK GUERRA & STEFAN AL, BEYOND MOBILITY: PLANNING CITIES 
FOR PEOPLE AND PLACES 199–206 (2017) (explaining the transformative impact that driverless 
cars would have on urban planning, such as parking needs); see also Dimitris Milakis, Bart van 
Arem & Bert van Wee, Policy and Society Related Implications of Automated Driving: A Review of 
Literature and Directions for Future Research, 21 J. INTELLIGENT TRANSP. SYS. 324, 340–42 (2017) 
(discussing more broadly the implications of redirecting urban planning decisions to accommodate 
automated driving). 
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competitive in places where there is high cloud cover or where there is 
high demand at night or during dark winter months).  
Indeed, there is considerable interest in replacing the notion of 
a “silver bullet” policy that would address all the challenges of climate 
change in a unified manner with “silver buckshot” that would 
accommodate many different but complementary policy approaches, 
with each addressing a subset of the climate challenge.102 The “silver 
buckshot” idea has gained currency not only among policy scholars but 
also among some activists, such as Bill McKibben,103 and politicians, 
such as Jay Inslee.104 The silver buckshot approach remains very 
controversial, and many other activists argue that it will dilute support 
for comprehensive and largely monolithic policies, which they view as 
the only way to address the scale of the climate problem.105 Lindblom 
observed, however, that comprehensive policies that entail drastic 
change are almost always politically unfeasible: “A fast-moving 
sequence of small changes can more speedily accomplish a drastic 
alteration of the status quo than can an only infrequent major  
policy change.”106 
 
 102. See MAXWELL BOYKOFF, CREATIVE (CLIMATE) COMMUNICATIONS: PRODUCTIVE PATHWAYS 
FOR SCIENCE, POLICY AND SOCIETY 190, 215 (2019) (explaining how the concept of “silver buckshot” 
allows for multimodal communication of climate change challenges and solutions); Elke U. Weber, 
Climate Change Demands Behavioral Change: What Are the Challenges?, 82 SOC. RSCH. 561, 568 
(2015) (preferring the “buckshot” approach to climate change problem-solving); Barry W. Brook, 
Tom Blees, Tom M.L. Wigley & Sanghyun Hong, Silver Buckshot or Bullet: Is a Future “Energy 
Mix” Necessary?, 10 SUSTAINABILITY 302 (2018) (considering the “buckshot” theory as it relates to 
a proposed sustainable energy mix response to climate change). 
 103. Bill McKibben, Welcome to the Climate Crisis How to Tell Whether a Candidate Is Serious 




 104. Benjamin Wallace-Wells, Jay Inslee Wants to Be a Presidential Candidate for the Climate-
Change Era, NEW YORKER (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/the-political-
scene/jay-inslee-wants-to-be-a-presidential-candidate-for-the-climate-change-era 
[https://perma.cc/8NWQ-UA5C]. 
 105. See, e.g., Michael E. Mann, Lifestyle Changes Aren’t Enough to Save the Planet. Here’s 
What Could, TIME (Sept. 12, 2019, 7:14 AM), https://time.com/5669071/lifestyle-changes-climate-
change/ [https://perma.cc/Q249-U6UU]; Michael E. Mann & Jonathan Brockopp, You Can’t Save 
the Climate by Going Vegan. Corporate Polluters Must Be Held Accountable, USA TODAY (June 3, 
2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2019/06/03/climate-change-requires-coll 
ective-action-more-than-single-acts-column/1275965001/ [https://perma.cc/44F7-U8EB]; Natalie 
Hanman, Naomi Klein: ‘We Are Seeing the Beginnings of the Era of Climate Barbarism,’ GUARDIAN 
(Sept. 14, 2019, 3:01 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/books/2019/sep/14/naomi-klein-we-are-
seeing-the-beginnings-of-the-era-of-climate-barbarism [https://perma.cc/PK78-LEQ6] (advocating 
for a transformation of the economy to stop climate change); Dawn Stover, “Silver Buckshot” Isn’t 
Enough to Fix the Climate, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (Apr. 1, 2019), https://thebulletin.org 
/2019/04/silver-buckshot-isnt-enough-to-fix-the-climate/ [https://perma.cc/V2JK-JSPA]. 
 106. Lindblom, Still Muddling, supra note 24, at 520. 
          
2020] COMPLEX SYSTEMS AND CLIMATE CHANGE 1801 
By focusing on the irreversible consequences of taking action, 
Rittel and Webber, and a considerable portion of the subsequent 
literature on wicked problems, divert attention from the far more 
significant irreversible opportunity costs of not taking action. Levin and 
Lazarus’s superwicked concept begins to correct for this by introducing 
the urgency of taking rapid action. Climate change differs from many 
other pollution problems because, whereas the Clean Air Act criteria 
pollutants disperse and are removed from the atmosphere rapidly if 
emissions are curtailed, atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide 
will remain high for millennia after emissions cease.107 This means that 
climate change is driven not by changes in the annual emissions of 
greenhouse gases so much as by the cumulative total of emissions from 
the beginning of the industrial revolution.108 Thus, if cumulative 
emissions exceed a threshold for dangerous or even catastrophic harm, 
rapidly curtailing emissions will not remove that harm.109  
The world experienced a similar, but far milder, example of this 
when a hole appeared in the ozone layer over Antarctica in 1979. 
Chlorofluorocarbon (“CFC”) chemicals, the dominant cause of ozone 
depletion, have atmospheric lifetimes of roughly 50 to 140 years.110 CFC 
emissions largely ceased in the mid-1990s, but the annual ozone hole 
has persisted over the subsequent two-and-a-half decades, showing only 
a slow contraction so that the size and severity of the ozone hole in 
recent years remains comparable to the late 1980s.111 
When the cost of delay is severe, as it is for climate change, any 
paralysis or indecisiveness induced by worrying about wickedness 
becomes very expensive. Delays can arise both in formulating policy and 
 
 107. See Susan Solomon, Gian-Kasper Plattner, Reto Knutti & Pierre Friedlingstein, 
Irreversible Climate Change Due to Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 106 PROCS. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 1704, 
1704–06 (2009); David Archer & Victor Brovkin, The Millennial Atmospheric Lifetime of 
Anthropogenic CO2, 90 CLIMATIC CHANGE 283, 294 (2008) (concluding that a “substantial fraction” 
of carbon emissions will remain in the atmosphere for thousands of years); David Archer, Michael 
Eby, Victor Brovkin, Andy Ridgwell, Long Cao, Uwe Mikolajewicz, Ken Caldeira, Katsumi 
Matsumoto, Guy Munhoven, Alvaro Montenegro & Kathy Tokos, Atmospheric Lifetime of Fossil 
Fuel Carbon Dioxide, 37 ANN. REV. EARTH & PLANETARY SCIS. 117, 131 (2009) (concluding  
the same). 
 108. See Matthews et al., supra note 93, at 829–32; Frame et al., supra note 94, at 692–93. 
 109. See Stocker, supra note 94, at 280–82 (explaining how cumulative emissions may 
foreclose the possibility of mitigating climate harms); Solomon et al., supra note 107, at 1704–06 
(discussing the potential for irreversible harm when cumulative emissions thresholds are reached). 
 110. M. Rigby, R.G. Prinn, S. O’Doherty, S.A. Montzka, A. McCulloch, C.M. Harth, J. Mühle, 
P.K. Salameh, R.F. Weiss, D. Young, P.G. Simmonds, B.D. Hall, G.S. Dutton, D. Nance, D.J. 
Mondeel, J.W. Elkins, P.B. Krummel, L.P. Steele & P.J. Fraser, Re-evaluation of the Lifetimes of 
the Major CFCs and CH3CCl3 Using Atmospheric Trends, 13 ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY & PHYSICS 
2691, 2698 (2013). 
 111. NASA Ozone Watch, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN.: GODDARD SPACE FLIGHT CTR., 
https://ozonewatch.gsfc.nasa.gov/statistics/annual_data.html (last updated Oct. 18, 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/9PFL-R6JQ]. 
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in enacting and implementing it. Delays in formulating policy often 
arise from an aversion to uncertainty and a desire to obtain robust 
scientific knowledge, capable of making reliable predictions about the 
consequences of different courses of action. When the cost of delay 
makes it necessary to act without hesitation despite considerable 
scientific uncertainty, the role of science in guiding policymaking 
changes. Sheila Jasanoff identified time pressure as one of the  
most important characteristics separating regulatory science from  
research science: 
While scientists working in a “pure” research setting have relatively unlimited 
time . . . for testing hypotheses or proving conjectures, scientists working to meet policy 
needs are under constant pressure to deliver results quickly. In the regulatory context, a 
decision to wait for more data amounts to (or is perceived as) a decision not to act.112 
Regardless of how effective and efficient a policy would be once 
implemented, it will be useless if political opposition prevents it from 
being enacted. Where the cost of delay is great, even a minor delay in 
enacting a policy can greatly reduce its value. Even when a policy has 
majority support among the public and public officials, concerted 
political opposition can obstruct the policy.113 Thus, policy analysis for 
climate change must account for initiative feasibility.114 And 
incrementally muddling through with a diverse set of small initiatives 
may succeed far better than focusing on large policies, which may 
attract much more powerful opposition.115 
B. Through when the Road Forks 
In addition to accounting for initiative feasibility, muddling 
through approaches to climate policy must address forks in the road: 
many climate mitigation initiatives confront the long lifetime of built 
infrastructure and the interactions between different types of 
 
 112. JASANOFF, supra note 7, at 78. 
 113. See Gilligan & Vandenbergh, supra note 62, at 2 (“[L]egislative gridlock can delay or 
prevent action even when a large majority of the public supports it.”); VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, 
supra note 83, at 66–73 (emphasizing both how delaying climate policies can severely limit their 
impact and why structural and ideological features of the American political system impede the 
implementation of even popular such policies). 
 114. See VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 83, at 91 (advocating for climate policy 
analysis that considers potential political costs and delays in determining an initiative’s 
feasibility); Jonathan M. Gilligan & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Accounting for Political Feasibility 
in Climate Instrument Choice, 32 VA. ENV’T L.J. 1 (2014) [hereinafter Gilligan & Vandenbergh, 
Political Feasibility] (proposing that political opportunity costs help determine the feasibility of 
climate policy instruments). 
 115. See Lindblom, Still Muddling, supra note 24, at 520–21 (explaining how incremental 
politics can achieve policy goals piecemeal, without generating the opposition often wrought by 
drastic change). 
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infrastructure in facilitating or obstructing additional actions to reduce 
emissions. These characteristics of infrastructure create critical forks 
in the policy road where it is much easier and cost-effective to take 
certain policy choices early, and missing those opportunities makes it 
much more difficult and expensive to pursue them later on.116 For 
instance, once a power plant has been built, often costing billions of 
dollars, it has a lifetime of many decades, and the incremental costs of 
providing fuel can be much smaller than the sunk cost of construction. 
This rapidly raises the marginal cost of switching from fossil fuels to 
clean energy as new fossil fuel energy infrastructure is built.117 These 
rising costs can lead to carbon lock-in: the more new fossil-powered 
energy infrastructure is constructed, the harder and more expensive it 
becomes to transition to clean energy.118 
We have identified a number of forks in the road for climate 
policy: opportunities to take policy choices in the near future that will 
steer the evolution of the United States’ infrastructure and built 
environment—energy generation and transmission, transportation, 
and buildings—along a clean path but where failing to take the 
opportunity soon will make it much harder to do so later on, both 
because of lock-in effects and because of synergies among many aspects 
of green infrastructure.119 For instance, if a transition to electric 
vehicles and a transition of the electrical grid from fossil to clean power 
are coordinated, emissions associated with the energy used by the 
vehicles will drop, and the battery storage in the vehicles can help to 
stabilize the transmission grid against supply-and-demand 
fluctuations, easing the transition to high penetration of renewable 
 
 116. See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jonathan M. Gilligan, Climate Law and Policy: Forks in 
the Road, 30 DUKE ENV’T L. & POL’Y F. (forthcoming 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3543639&download=yes [https://perma.cc/AZ35-B52M] (contending the 
need for urgent climate change action in part stems from the likely inefficacy of delayed policies). 
 117. See Steven J. Davis, Ken Caldeira & H. Damon Matthews, Future CO2 Emissions and 
Climate Change from Existing Energy Infrastructure, 329 SCIENCE 1330, 1333 (2010) (discussing 
the long-term energy commitments and “infrastructural inertia” of carbon emissions sources 
worldwide); Martin I. Hoffert, Ken Caldeira, Atul K. Jain, Erik F. Haites, L.D. Danny Harvey, 
Seth D. Potter, Michael E. Schlesinger, Stephen H. Schneider, Robert G. Watts, Tom M.L. Wigley 
& Donald J. Wuebbles, Energy Implications of Future Stabilization of Atmospheric CO2 Content, 
395 NATURE 881, 884 (1998) (noting the “massive transition” required to decarbonize existing 
energy production and infrastructure). 
 118. See Peter Erickson, Sivan Kartha, Michael Lazarus & Kevin Tempest, Assessing Carbon 
Lock-In, ENV’T RSCH. LETTERS, Aug. 2015 (explaining the difficulty in moving away from carbon-
intensive energy sources); Christoph Bertram, Nils Johnson, Gunnar Luderer, Keywan Riahi, 
Morna Isaac & Jiyong Eom, Carbon Lock-In Through Capital Stock Inertia Associated with Weak 
Near-Term Climate Policies, 90 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 62, 70–71 (2015) (discussing 
the challenge carbon lock-in poses for transitioning energy sources). 
 119. See Vandenbergh & Gilligan, supra note 116 (outlining the importance of decarbonizing 
the electric grid, electrifying transportation, electrifying buildings, and emphasizing the risks and 
costs of delaying their implementation). 
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energy sources.120 If neither transition is pursued in the near future, 
the number of new gasoline-powered vehicles on the road, with expected 
lifetimes close to twenty years, and the number of newly built fossil-fuel 
power plants, with expected lifetimes of forty years or more, would 
make it difficult to reverse course and pursue these two synergetic 
policies later on. Other forks in the road connect the transition to clean 
electricity with policies that would encourage the electrification of 
appliances such as furnaces, stoves, and water heaters.121 
We emphasize that accounting for forks in the road is not 
inconsistent with a muddling through approach. Indeed, when we take 
account of initiative feasibility and the cost of delay, a diverse and 
incremental approach of policymaking by muddling through is 
essential. Combining these approaches enables us to focus on the most 
important, viable actions and to take at least some action before the 
forks in the road recede into the distance in our rearview mirror. 
Where the traditional wicked problem paradigm promotes 
paralysis and an attitude of defeat, the superwicked problem paradigm 
restores a sense of urgency in taking action, even if the actions are 
imperfect. When we realize that there is no complete solution to the 
problem of climate change, that inaction is likely to impose irreversible 
and unrepairable costs and dangers far more severe than flawed 
actions, and that the longer we wait to take action, the fewer options 
will remain, wickedness can become a stimulus to act rather than a 
source of paralysis. As Samuel Johnson noted, “[W]hen a man knows he 
is to be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates his mind wonderfully.”122 
Returning to Lindblom’s notion of managing complex problems by 
muddling through, we need to learn how to muddle quickly and 
decisively under this time pressure. 
C. Addressing the Urgency of Climate Change Through  
Polycentric and Private-Sector Governance 
Two keys to muddling quickly are to recognize first that there 
will be no single best policy and second that a silver buckshot approach, 
with many small complementary and hopefully synergetic policies, is 
more likely to achieve high initiative feasibility and rapid 
implementation than a large monolithic policy.123 Moreover, when 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. JAMES BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 612 (David Womersley ed., Penguin 
Classics, 2008). 
 123. See S. Pacala & R. Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for the 
Next 50 Years with Current Technologies, 305 SCIENCE 968, 969–71 (2004) (arguing that carbon 
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multiple policies are deployed it will be possible to assess their 
performance in practice and either make midcourse adjustments or 
drop policies that do not produce results. 
Polycentric governance can play an important role in muddling 
quickly.124 International treaties and national governments are far from 
the only powerful players in shaping climate policy. State and 
provincial governments, municipal governments, and the private sector 
can all play important roles in mitigating greenhouse gas emissions.125 
Initiative feasibility varies considerably across the different levels of 
public and private governance.  
Some initiatives are most feasible at the large scale of national 
government, due to coordination and collective action. Other initiatives 
will be most feasible at the state or local level if federal legislative and 
regulatory institutions are trapped in partisan gridlock. Still other 
initiatives may be more feasible at the private-sector level. For 
instance, private corporate buyers have far more power, through their 
supply chain contracting, to influence greenhouse gas emissions by 
manufacturers in China than the U.S. government does because they 
are neither constrained by the checks and balances of public 
government nor by international free-trade treaties.126 Private 
governance initiatives can also avoid the ideological opposition to 
regulation that obstructs many public governance initiatives in the 
United States.127 
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Private-sector governance of greenhouse gas emissions can also 
serve an important role in overcoming the political and ideological 
obstacles that result from solution aversion and other related 
psychological phenomena.128 Significant challenges must still be 
addressed, however, in using private-sector governance effectively 
without allowing it to undermine parallel efforts to expand  
public governance.129 
D. Climate Governance by Muddling Through 
What would it mean in practice to govern climate change by 
muddling through? The muddling through approach has two aspects: 
incremental policy analysis and incremental political praxis.130 The 
incremental analysis aspect addresses the problem of bounded 
rationality: it is generally not possible to examine all possible responses 
to a policy problem in sufficient detail to reliably assess and compare 
their merits, even when there is an agreed scale on which to measure 
them. This relates to Alvin Weinberg’s concept of trans-science and 
Jasanoff’s concept of regulatory science.131 The political praxis aspect 
focuses on the process of obtaining sufficient agreement to adopt a 
policy. Lindblom argues that comprehensive “big-step” reforms are 
rarely politically feasible because “[t]oo many conflicting interests pull 
them apart. . . . The odds of agreement among political elites or citizens 
on [all the parts of such initiatives] are extremely slim”;132 whereas, 
“[i]ncremental steps can be made quickly because . . . [t]hey do not rock 
the boat, do not stir up the great antagonisms and paralyzing schisms 
as do proposals for more drastic change.”133  
These two aspects of muddling through interact, so one way of 
making the scope of analysis manageable is to eliminate any policy 
measures that are deemed politically unfeasible.134 Moreover, by 
focusing on smaller, more incremental policies, it becomes easier to 
draw on existing knowledge to assess both their likely effects and their 
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initiative feasibility.135 Combining the analysis and praxis aspects, 
muddling through consists of making progress through a succession of 
incremental changes, each of which focuses on making an adequate 
amount of progress within the scope of what is both politically and 
technologically feasible at the time. Lindblom’s approach has had a 
large and lasting impact on policy analysis and continues to be widely 
cited and discussed.136  
Subsequent developments that build on Lindblom draw on the 
biological metaphor of punctuated equilibrium to describe incremental 
policy progress as a sequence of small changes, interrupted by the 
occasional large and dramatic change that reframes the political 
landscape.137 These large jumps cannot be predicted, however, and 
there is no consensus on how to incorporate them into operational 
politics and policymaking.138 
Marsden et al. provide a detailed example in the specific case of 
the transport sector in the UK.139 This work joins Lindblom’s muddling 
through to a multilevel view of governance that emphasizes the role of 
local governments and nongovernmental actors, including but not 
limited to private industry, in bypassing political gridlock at the 
national scale. It examines case studies of four cities in the UK and 
compares the ways they pursued emissions-reduction targets for the 
transportation sector in the absence of an overarching national target. 
The study finds inconsistent and mostly small progress by the different 
cities and concludes that while a theoretical framework of muddling 
through combined with multilevel governance is useful for 
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understanding and evaluating progress, it does not identify an easy or 
straightforward path to emissions reduction: 
In complex policy spaces such as climate change, incrementalism is perhaps inevitable. If 
incrementalism is to achieve progress along a pathway to significant carbon reduction, 
then a clearer remit for carbon reduction for governmental and non-governmental actors 
at all levels is required and greater emphasis needs to be placed on the delivery 
framework for steering change.140 
In contrast to this, our own work on private-governance 
approaches to emissions reduction provides greater reason to hope for 
important emissions reductions through incremental nongovernmental 
initiatives.141 One example of this is corporate supply-chain contracting 
initiatives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Large corporate buyers 
have used supply-chain contracting to reduce the annual emissions 
from their suppliers by more than 560 million metric tons of carbon-
dioxide equivalent, with the potential to expand this to more than one 
billion tons through straightforward actions.142 This is a small fraction 
of the emissions reductions necessary to stabilize global greenhouse gas 
concentrations, but it represents meaningful incremental progress that 
other initiatives can build upon. We argue that in assessing the impact 
of incremental measures, it is important not to hold any one measure 
against the total scope of the climate challenge but to ask whether it 
makes meaningful progress and whether it complements other 
measures that could add up to large-scale change.143 
CONCLUSION 
Rittel and Webber’s paper on wicked problems identifies real 
and serious challenges for making policy at the messy and complex 
intersection of natural science and technology with social science and 
politics, but it does not offer any practical guidance about how to 
address these challenges. The subsequent literature has refined the 
concept of wicked problems and has made important advances in 
managing wicked problems. The literature on wicked problems, 
however, remains hobbled by the focus on the ten criteria spelled out in 
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Rittel and Webber’s original paper. These criteria induce paralysis in 
the policy analyst and the manager, whose subsequent work is only able 
to escape by watering down the definition of wickedness. At the same 
time, other approaches to addressing problems at the intersection of 
technology with society—such as Weinberg’s trans-science, Jasanoff’s 
regulatory science, and Lindblom’s muddling through—avoid the 
paralyzing flaws of the wicked problems paradigm and offer greater 
pragmatic guidance to the manager or policymaker. 
The concept of superwickedness introduces an important new 
dimension to wicked problems—something that is also present in 
Jasanoff’s regulatory science: the element of time and the 
acknowledgement that delaying a policy decision is itself a 
consequential policy decision. This is especially important to the 
challenge of climate change, and this need for haste demands 
incremental approaches to managing complex problems. 
There is no escaping the challenge of achieving consensus on 
policy in a pluralistic society. This challenge is not unique to wicked 
problems, and to the extent that it becomes identified with wicked 
problems, every problem with a political element becomes wicked. If 
there is value to the concept of wicked problems, it is in reminding us 
that policy cannot be reduced to technocratic methods, such as 
mathematical optimization. But this is no longer the novel insight it 
was in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
We conclude that the wicked problem concept brings more 
problems than help to the policymaker or manager and that there are 
better ways to think about and respond to complex socio-technical 
problems. Among these, Lindblom’s muddling through approach, which 
preceded wicked problems by more than a decade, has stood the test of 
time far better and remains one of the most useful ways to think about 
these problems.144  
Lindblom, Rittel and Webber, and many others have observed 
that in the complex and messy realm of socio-technical policy problems, 
the distinction between means and end blurs, so the two cannot be 
treated separately. The oblique strategies advocated by Hulme and 
Pielke are a promising response to this and other challenges, but these 
strategies require greater attention to the urgency inherent in 
superwicked problems. Polycentric governance, with clear attention to 
the role of the private sector, is crucial to overcoming political gridlock 
caused by the ideological aversion to public governance.  
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There is urgent work to do in governing greenhouse gas 
emissions and other aspects of climate change. If there is one lesson 
that emerges clearly from the wicked problems paradigm, it is that 
there will be no perfect solution, and indeed, no political agreement over 
what characteristics would make a potential solution perfect. Every 
year, atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases rise ever higher, 
and every year in which policymaking is delayed further constrains the 
options available for addressing the challenge of climate change.  
Whether through our preference for an incremental process of 
muddling through with polycentric governance or others’ preference for 
thinking about wickedness and oblique strategies, it is less important 
that we agree on a theoretical paradigm for policymaking than that we 
overcome inertia and gridlock by any means possible. 
 
 
